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Sniadachl Randone,2 and soon, Fuentes,3 all cases to reckon with,
as Dean Pound might have said in "Progress of the Law" (or as Frank-
furter did say, "The history of American freedom is in no small measure
the history of procedure.").4 Within the three year span since Sniadach
first declared that the opportunity to be heard must be "meaningful" in
fact as well as in theory, there has been a literal decimation of pre-
judgment attachment statutes. But there is much surprise in store for
those who have failed to envision the far broader implications in the
now constitutionally fostered requirement that "society... must recog-
nize a moral obligation to see that disputes are resolved on the basis of
their merits rather than on the basis of the relative power of the con-
testants."
While technically Sniadach only found a lack of due process in a
Wisconsin wage garnishment statute which failed to provide for a prior
court hearing, thus sanctioning a "taking" without provision for prior
notice and hearing, its import has been more broadly recognized as an
assault on a whole variety of ex parte prejudgment remedies. In addition
to its most recent application to a so-called trustee attachment, or
garnishment, of a bank account,6 due process has invalidated statutory
replevin,7 seizure by an innkeeper,8 confession of judgment, reposses-
sion of residence, ° landlord's levy on tenant's possessions," seizure by
* B.A., 1936, Yale University; LL.B., 1939, Harvard University; LL.M., 1940, Harvard
University.
' Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 37 (1969).
2 Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Ct. of Sacramento County, 5 Cal. 3d 536,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
a Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.). Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S.
906 (1971).
4 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
5 B. CMUSTENSEN, LAWYERs FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANs 79 (1970) [hereinafter
B. CHRiSTE SEN. See Brown & Cohen, Book Review, 5 VAL. L. REv. 683 (1971). The Randone
court emphasized that, "[Sniadach] is not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the
mainstream of the past procedural due process decisions of the United States Supreme
Court." 5 Cal. Sd at 550, 488 P.2d at 22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
6 Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Ct. of Sacramento County, 5 Cal. 3d 536,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
7 Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
8 Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
9 Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 991
(1970).
'0 Mihans v. Municipal Ct., 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ist Ct. App. 1970).
11 Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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a hospital,12 imprisonment of a debtor,' 3 required prior payment of
rent as a condition precedent to a profferred defense,14 termination of
employment,15 and seizure by a landlord.16 Since many states have a
variety of such statutory attachment procedures, without provision for
pre-attachment notice and opportunity to be heard,' it is patent that
a silent revolution has occurred.
Nonetheless, in many jurisdictions, it has been "business as usual"
with no visible change in statutory attachment procedures that are
patently void on their face.' 8 Since the man on the street can hardly
be expected to become sufficiently knowledgeable in such an abstruse
subject, it is incumbent on counsel to assert these constitutional safe-
guards. Where such fundamental rights are involved, perhaps courts
should act sua sponte. To the apparent dismay of many, since Sniadach
and Randone each involved less than three hundred dollars, the labor-
ing oar in their trials and appeals accordingly fell to conception and
prosecution by OEO funded law offices.
While it is necessary to probe the rationale of these cases for the
standards governing existing statutes as well as a guide for remedial
proposals, it will be seen that a narrow view of their principles will not
suffice. To the contrary, there has now developed a hard-nosed, practical
approach to the constitutional guarantees that there be real meaning in
the opportunity to be heard. In contrast with the previous syllogism
under which a wage garnishment had been condoned as a "temporary"
measure, rather than the "taking of property,"' 9 Sniadach enunciated
the materialistic view that the "use" of the attached wages between
garnishment and ultimate decision, was indeed "property," 20 the denial
12 McConaghley v. City of New York, 60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
'a Desmond v. Hachey, 315 F. Supp. 38 (D. Me. 1970).
14Amanuensis Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S,2d 11 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1971).
15 Ricucd v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
16 See Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (seizure of clothing and
personal possessions by innkeeper). Mihans v. Municipal Ct., 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1st. Ct. App. 1970) (summary repossession of a debtor's dwelling); Downs v. Jacobs,
272 A.2d 706 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1970).
17 E.g., in Massachusetts, see trustee process (MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 246, §§ 1 et seq.
(Cum. Supp. 1963)); arrest on mesne process, with postjudicial sanction (id. ch. 224, §§ I
et seq. (1955 recompilation)); attachment of real and personal property (id. ch. 223, § 42)
with certain exceptions, such as for an automobile (id. ch. 223, § 44A), wherein prior
court approval is required, or for garnishment of wages, where prior judgment as well as
court approval is required (id. ch. 240, § 32 (Cum. Supp. 1963)).
18 See Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Ct. of Sacramento County, 5 Cal. 3d
536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
19 McInnes v. McKay, 27 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
20 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 295 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J. concurring).
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of which often resulted in serious hardship.21 In opening the door for
discussion of "serious economic hardship," the Supreme Court has thus
swept aside once and for all, the intransigence of the legal profession
in failing to address itself to the economic realities of litigational ex-
penses. It is this refreshingly clean approach that has excited so much
law review exposition by neophyte attorneys.
22
To illustrate, while noting the argument that because a real estate
attachment does not deny an owner the possessory use of his property,
thus constituting a seemingly less severe deprivation, Randone acknowl-
edged the comment that such freely allowed attachments may precipi-
tate bankruptcies as the only procedure through which creditors can
obtain pro rata treatmentm rather than be subjected to the accidental
priorities in their order of attachments. 2 4 Such attachments could thus
be regarded as an invitation to bankruptcy for going concerns that
might otherwise remain solvent. It might also have been noted that
a property lien constitutes an immediate disparagement of credit, as
well as a diminution in mortgageability. Strangely, while the ability to
pay one's debts as they mature has long been recognized in insolvency
matters, the importance of "cash flow" for litigants has been sub-
stantially ignored.
Perhaps more boldly, consideration was also given to the claim that
in the absence of the availability of garnishment without prior notice,
unsecured creditors would either have to increase their interest rates
or decline to extend credit to marginal borrowers. 25 While noting that
such claims were not proven26 and that such liberal credit extension
policies might not serve the public interest,27 the court found the
21 Id. at 341-42.
22 See, e.g., Note, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 837 (1971) [hereinafter Constitutional
Validity]; Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUm. L. REV. 942 (1970); Comment,
Expanding Limitations on Prejudgment Attachment: Reverberations of Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 12 B.C. IND. & Cox. L. REv. 700 (1971); Comment, Prejudgment Wage
Garnishment: Notice and Hearing Requirements Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
11 B.C. IND. 9- Cox. L. R v. 462 (1970).
23 5 Cal. 3d at 544-45 n.4, 556 n.18, 488 P.2d at 18 n.4, 26 n.18, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
714 n.4, 722 n.18.
24 Note, Attachment in California: A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1254,
1264 (1970).
25 5 Cal. 3d at 555, 488 P.2d at 25-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 721-22.
26 Id., 488 P.2d at 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 722, citing Constitutional Validity at 846 and
Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
1214, 1240-42 (1965).
27 5 Cal. 3d at 556, 488 P.2d at 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 722, citing Note, Garnishment of
Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and its Implica-
tions for Related Areas of the Law, 68 Mici L. Ray. 986, 997 (1970).
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crucial factor to be the inferiority of such sophristry to the constitu-
tional requirement of due process. In the exact words of Randone:
The private interest of a creditor, even in the special circum-
stances of "absconding" or "concealing assets" . . . does not rise to
the level of an "overwhelming consideration" . . . so as to justify
a deprivation of such "brutal" dimensions without a prior hearing
on the merits. 28
In substance, to authorize the general deprivation of a debtor's use
of his property before notice and hearing, the statute must demonstrate
some "state or creditor interest" 29 of "overriding significance" 30 that
requires such procedure and which is confined to such extraordinary
circumstances. The severity of that burden is disclosed in the two per-
missible situations cited by the majority in Sniadach, namely the
summary seizure of bank assets in case of serious financial difficulty 3'
or the seizure of misbranded drugs by the Food and Drug Administra-
tor.3 2 In the view of Randone, the legislature could constitutionally draft
a statute of narrow application, exempting necessities, and permitting
attachment after notice and hearing on the probable validity of the
creditor's claim, or even permitting attachment before notice where an
ex parte showing can satisfy a court of an actual risk of concealment
or absconding.33
Understandably, there has been almost no discussion of the repercus-
sions flowing from the voiding of such prejudgment attachment statutes.
For example, under the Bankruptcy Act, certain preferences may satisfy
the requirement of an "act of bankruptcy. ' 34 It would now appear
doubtful, for example, whether the garnishment of a debtor's bank
account under a void attachment statute, could legally constitute such
an act of bankruptcy even if the debtor were unable to have the lien
removed within the prescribed time limit. Similarly, accepting the prop-
osition that such a bank garnishment statute is void, it may be question-
able whether the garnishee is legally protected in the payment of
debtor's funds to the attaching creditor even in response to what would
now appear to be a void court order which is subject to collateral attack.
Obviously, the same due process principles govern both federal
and state tax attachment statutes, most prominently the pervasive
28 5 Cal. 3d at 562, 488 P.2d at 30-31, 96 Cal. Rptr, at 726-27.
29 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 339.
30 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
31 See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
32 See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
33 5 Cal. 3d at 562, 488 P.2d at 31, 96 Cal Rptr. at 727.
34 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(3) (1970).
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Internal Revenue Code arsenal including wage attachments, bank ac-
count and account receivable garnishment, seizure of personal property,
business seizure, and even real estate attachment.z5 Although there may
be "overriding significance" in the ultimate collection of taxes, it is
doubtful that such exigency encompasses ex parte threshold self-help
by the bureaucracy. Although a narrowly redrafted statute might permit
a modicum of such relief, the overreach of the existing statute pre-
cisely reflects the provisions which were stricken in Randone. Curiously,
although such IRC liens would now seem to be void in themselves,
certain of the tax priorities specified in the Bankruptcy Act would
appear to retain their vigor because of their subordinance to judicial
sanction.m3 6
Nevertheless, there could be awesome repercussions through liti-
gation in behalf of offended debtors against anyone who has denied
them their constitutional rights through the use of such void prejudg-
ment attachment statutes.37 Significantly, the Supreme Court has
recently held that under that seldom used statute of Civil War vintage,
relief may be had against a private individual jointly engaged with
state officials. 38 Perhaps some of the terrifying consequences of inaction
may serve to galvanize both federal and state legislatures into the
prompt revamping or repeal of void or voidable statutes which dearly
trespass upon the constitutional rights of so many.
Of predictably comparable magnitude with Sniadach and Randone,
is the case of Fuentes v. Faircloth.39 In another OEO supported appeal,
the Court will pass on the due process constitutionality of a U.C.C.
type statute permitting a secured party to utilize self-help repossession
and foreclosure procedures without judicial preview. In the particular
instance, a Spanish-speaking woman purchased a space heater, executing
a note and security agreement for the balance. Claiming a malfunction
in the heater, she discontinued payment, whereupon the secured party
proceeded on the basis of its unilateral determination that a default
existed. While the district court sustained the constitutionality of
Florida's typical state replevin law permitting forcible entry and taking,
it is fair to speculate that in the light of Sniadach, the noting of prob-
able jurisdiction could well forecast a due process reversal such as was
3 5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6321-26.
36 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970).
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
38 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970).
39 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
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dealt by a district court to New York's replevin statute.40 The case may
also involve the issue of the validity of a contractual waiver of consti-
tutional rights where there is gross imbalance between the bargaining
positions of the contracting parties.41
The generic problem inherent in these developments, is that of
providing quality legal services in civil matters to people of moderate
means, itself the subject of a recent scholarly exposition by Barlow F.
Christensen,42 a Senior Research Attorney of the American Bar Founda-
tion. While noting the obvious fact that the wealthy are both legally
sophisticated and financially able to afford the best of legal services and
that numerous agencies are available to try to service the needs of the
indigent, Mr. Christensen severely faults the Bar for ignoring the plight
of the tens of millions of middle class persons who neither know their
rights nor can afford the currently prevailing costs for quality legal
services.
Despite some dampening efforts, it is no longer indiscreet to
discuss such problems as solicitation and legal fees, particularly where
some of the principal impediments to a meaningful opportunity to be
heard may emanate from archaic concepts which may no longer be
defensible. It would be an unenviable task to attempt to convince lay
audiences that it is either unethical or criminal for an attorney to stir
laymen to assert their constitutionally protected rights, particularly in
such areas as civil rights, ecology, and consumer protection. Indeed,
the implications of such repression would appear to fuel criticism that
goes to the very foundation of the judicial system.
To illustrate further, while there are numerous problems inherent
in contingent legal fees,43 historically they have had to be condoned as
one of the few available cash means of opening the doors of the law
office to the ordinary man on the street. Only recently, in denying
a motion to remove to a more convenient forum, the court expressly
relied on the plaintiff's financial inability to maintain the suit if the
case were removed to a distant jurisdiction. 45 Yet other courts have
wholly ignored the realities of obtaining competent counsel to handle
complicated litigation on a contingent fee basis, by expressly ruling that
40 Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
41 See Comment, Expanding Limitations on Prejudgment Attachment: Reverberations
of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rav. 700 (1971).
42 B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 5.
43 See Brown, Some Observations on Legal Fees, 24 Sw. L.J. 565 (1970).
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
45 Beach v. National Football League, TRADE REG. REP. 73,710 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
1971).
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the "convenience of counsel [sic]" is an immaterial consideration in
such a motion to remove.46
In a related instance, while it has consistently been ruled that the
antitrust laws cannot be used as a defense to a suit on a debt unless the
latter implicitly involves an antitrust violation,47 there may be serious
due process question in the "brutal" exposure to which a debtor may
thereby be subjected. While a state court has recently found a con-
venient solution to this dilemma by voluntarily staying further pro-
ceedings until a federal court determination of the antitrust issues,48
certiorari has been denied in a petition raising the direct question.49
There are many alternative methods designed to improve the
delivery of quality legal services to the massive segment of the popula-
tion now deprived of meaningful access. While the ABA has ruled
unethical such extended payment plans as Bankamericard, the Bar of
Oregon has officially sanctioned its use.50 Prepaid legal cost insurance
plans proliferate when associated with specific kinds of liability policies,
yet insurance devoted exclusively to legal fees would appear to be con-
sidered improper. While numerous statutory remedies provide for
exemplary damages and legal fees in order to encourage private enforce-
ment, as a practical matter, the quaint eighteenth century rules against
solicitation effectively chill the vigorous use which the legislature in-
tended. For example, while it is now more than two years since
46 See Transcontinental Serv. Corp. v. True Temper Corp., 319 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Cressman v. United Airlines, 158 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
47 See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1959), quoting Continental Wall Paper
Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 271 (Holmes, J., dissenting); In the matter
of Otto's Liquor, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 73,538 (D. Minn. Sept, 28, 1970); see Helfenbein
v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), rehearing denied per curiam, id.
at 1072, cert. denied, - U.S. - (1971) (allegation that state detainer being used to enforce
franchisor's illegal tying).
48Diners/Fugazy Travel, Inc. v. Wirtz, TRADE REG. REP. 73,682 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County July 1, 1971) (franchisor's suit on debt in state court, met with antitrust defenses).
Assuming that the defendant in a suit on a debt has a valid antitrust claim against the
creditor it would appear obvious that, comparably with the unconstitutional attachment
in Randane,
[a] creditor seeking to gain leverage in order to compel a settlement could
excercise [his choice of attachment] so as to place a debtor under the most severe
deprivation.
... Thus sanction of such prenotice and prehearing attachments of necessities
will in many cases effectively deprive the debtor of any hearing on the merits of
the creditor's claim.
5 Cal. 3d at 561-62, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726. It has been claimed that alleged
antitrust violators use the same litigational strategy to deprive a debtor of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard on the merits of his antitrust claims.
49See Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc. 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), rehearing
denied per curiam, id. at 1072, cert. denied, - U.S. - (1971).
502 ABA OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHmics No. 1120 (Supp. 1971); Cf. OREGON ST. BAR
BuLL., Feb. 1970, at 11.
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Massachusetts granted direct consumer recourse for any violation of the
deceptive advertising prohibitions of the "Baby" F.T.C. Act,51 there
has been no reported use of the remedy. That inactivity is assuredly not
due to an absence of violations, but rather to an almost total lack of
awareness among aggrieved consumers and the supposedly ethical bar-
riers which impede consumer education.
With regard to the allegedly ethical considerations which impugn
the effective delivery of legal services to the broad middle spectrum of
the population, Mr. Christensen observed that:
[i]n presuming the infallibility and immutability of existing
restrictions and in ignoring the expressed desire of the public ... ,
those who would restrict enterprise by legal controls in the name
of the public good have the burden of proof, and a heavy one. The
public is not obliged to prove its need; the legal profession is
obliged to justify the restrictions. 52
Recognizing that solicitation may be the only meaningful way to apprise
people of their rights, he stated:
While the stirring up of frivolous or fraudulent claims is un-
doubtedly evil, the stirring up of legitimate claims which would
otherwise go unasserted because of the prospective claimants'
weakness, ignorance, or naivete may in fact be a positive good.53
Stated otherwise, while there is no rational basis for an irrebutable
presumption that attorneys will promote meretricious claims, there
is every reason to observe that both the economically disadvantaged and
the unsophisticated middle American need the crusading leadership of
the only professional whom society permits them to consult in order
to obtain all the recourse which the law provides. It is no longer accept-
able to suggest that the wealthy should have the constant availability
of professional advice as to the extent of their legal rights as well as
skilled advocates to pursue their remedies, while it is a crime to "foment
[sic]" the unknowledgeable concerning the protection now available
against such abuses as slumlords, gross misrepresentation in seller's talk,
or the attempted denigration of an express automobile warranty that is
void because it is unreasonable. 54
51 MASS. GEN. LAWS., ch. 93A, §§ 1 et seq. (particularly §§ 9-10) (Supp. 1971).
52 B. CHRISTENSEN 255-56.
53 ld. 145.
54 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-316(i); see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In noting that "debtors are frequently unaware of available
legal remedies," the Randone court commented that even post-attachment procedures to
obtain relief based on statutory exemption for necessities, could in the interim subject
debtors to the "extreme hardship" emphasized in Sniadach. 5 Cal. 3d at 562-63, 488 P.2d
at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
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After an exhaustive analysis of the numerous means which might
be employed in an effort to reduce legal costs through improved manage-
ment systems, Mr. Christensen turned at last to the "group legal
services," which now appear to offer the best prospect for immediate
satisfaction of the public need. Simply defined, such a plan involves
the provision of legal services on a salary or reduced fee basis through
a lay organization's activity in behalf of its members. While seeking to
alleviate the deepseated resentment of attorneys to the supposedly eco-
nomic threat to the profession, Mr. Christensen points out that the
profferred ethical objection of "potential conflict of interest" must
surrender to
other public-interest considerations-such as the importance of
the individual rights being asserted or the practical unavailability
of other sources of legal assistance.U5
In spite of the obdurate opposition of the organized bar,56 it would
appear that such "meaningful" protection for the public has been found
in the first amendment's guarantee of the freedom of litigational associa-
tion. Commencing with NAACP v. Button,57 the Supreme Court struck
down Virginia's anti-solicitation laws as applied to the civil rights
litigating activities of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People. A year later, the constitutionally protected scope of
group legal services was expanded in Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,58 wherein the Court afforded
similar protection to an arrangement in which a union negotiated a
discount in contingent fee arrangements and recommended lawyers to
union members for prosecution of their claims under the Federal
Employees Liability Act.59 Those who had read Button and Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen as protections for the assertion of federal
rights were disabused of such a narrow reading by United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,60 protecting an arrangement
in which a union's salaried attorney-employees represented union mem-
51 B. CHRISTENSEN 278.
56 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmIILrrY, Canon 2, Disciplinary Rule
2-103(D)(5), criticized in Nahstoll, Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrangements
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR-2-103(D)(5): Stale Wine in New Bottles,
48 TEXAS L. REv. 834, 850 (1970); See also Brown, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility:
In Defense of Mediocrity, 5 VAL. L. Rlv. 95 (1970); Moore, The Bar as Trade Association:
Economics, Ethics, and the First Amendment, 5 HA~v. CIv. RIasrrs-Civ. LiB. L. R a. 801
(1970).
57 871 US. 415 (1963).
58 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
5945 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1964).
60 889 U.S. 217 (1967).
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bers in prosecution of their personal injury claims under state law. And
in recently commenting on that trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court
again declared:
The common thread running through our decisions ...is that
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment. 61
In spite of that exhortation by the nation's highest court, a federal
district court in Chicago has dismissed a class antitrust suit by forty-two
convenience food mart franchisees on the ground that their attorney had
knowledge of their "solicitation" of support within their own associa-
tion.6 In that case, after ten months of unsuccessful bargaining with a
franchisor, a franchisees' association notified its members of the need
to litigate, and requested their participation and financial support.
When these facts were disclosed at a preliminary hearing, the court
dismissed the suit on the merits and referred, to the Illinois Bar Associa-
tion, a complaint against the association's attorney for his participation
in alleged solicitation. 63 Yet, the small businessman's need for legal
protection is so desperate, and the public policy favoring private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws is so strong,64 that Senator Philip Hart,
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly,
has suggested that the Small Business Administration should make loans
to small businessmen to finance meritorious antitrust claims. 65
In conclusion, it would appear obvious that Sniadach "et al" are
not to be narrowly translated within the confines of what prejudgment
attachment procedures may be sustainable.66 They are rather a clarion
call to the organized Bar and to all courts commanding the elimination
of every obstacle to the meaningful assertion of legal rights. For ex-
ample, counsel should not be required to tred a narrow path between
the terrifying consequences of alleged solicitation and the salutary
61 United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
62 Halverson v. Convenience Food Mart, Inc., C.A. No. 70C-499 (7th Cir. Mar. 3,
1970) (appeal pending).
63 Both the Illinois Bar Association and the Executive Committee of the District
Courts declined to take action against the attorney; cf. Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc.
v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970), regarding the rule for sparing the
use of dismissal as a means of enforcing a court's order.
64 See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947).
65 Release by the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Sept. 16, 1968.
66 [Sniadach] is not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the mainstream
of the past procedural due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Superior Ct. of Sacramento County, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 550,
488 P.2d 13, 22, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 718 (1971).
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protection of the first amendment. 7 Regardless of the begrudging con-
sent of the organized bar or of other courts, the nation's highest tri-
bunal has now made it emphatically clear that the first amendment
assures that "groups can unite to assert their legal rights as effectively
and economically as possible,"' 8 that it is improper to "jeopardize the
exercise of protected freedoms," 69 and that ". . . that right would be a
hollow promise if courts could deny associations of workers or others
the means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal repre-
sentation."7 0 Rather than hewing to the bare edge of the constitutional
thrust, both the courts71 and the Bar should constructively reexamine
supposedly sacred dogma and cooperatively strive to build a structure
that can realistically obtain justice. No less will suffice.
607"Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1962).
68 United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 580 (1971).
69 ld. at 581.
70 Id. at 585-86.
71 Court decisions have determined that matters of ethics are exculsively within the
jurisdiction of courts and cannot be changed by the legislature. See In re Unification of
the New Hampshire Bar, 109 N.H. 262, 248 A.2d 711 (1968); In re Integration of the
Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N.V.2d 500 (1946).
1971)
